Over the past few decades, we have grown accustomed to the idea that Democrats could easily win the popular vote but struggle to gain control of government.
This time there is a chance of a reversal. After years of winning without winning the popular vote, Republicans might need to win the most votes to win the House in 2022. There’s even a slim chance that something we haven’t seen since 1952: Republicans winning the most votes, but failing to take control of the government.
If you find that a little hard to believe, you’re not alone. I struggled to make sense of it when I reached those calculations myself. After all, gerrymandering skews the House slightly toward Republicans, though it’s not nearly as prominent as it once was.
But FiveThirtyEight came to a similar conclusion, Republicans “favoured to win a majority of seats if they win the popular vote by at least 0.4 points.” (These kinds of estimates are very imprecise — even a race going a little better than expected for Republicans could be enough to upset that kind of balance.)
One of the reasons the Democrats might achieve this is trivial: the number of contested races by only one of the main parties. This cycle, there are about twice as many races without a Democratic candidate as without a Republican candidate. Democrats will have no candidates in about two dozen races, compared to about a dozen for Republicans. Apparently no one in South Dakota or North Dakota wanted to run for the House as a Democrat.
The state of the 2022 midterm elections
With the primaries over, both parties are focused on the November 8 general election.
In all of these races, the Democrats win no popular votes at all, blunting their usual popular vote strength without hurting their chances in the districts that matter. It may seem like a cheap way for Republicans to improve their chances of “winning” the popular vote, but that’s how popular vote tallies for the House are recorded.
A second reason is a little more serious: the Democrats have the incumbent advantage in slightly more of the most crucial races than the Republicans. And the Republican advantage on the map is so small — just a few seats — that that kind of Democratic advantage in a few races can make a difference.
To take an example, let’s zoom in on the middle neighborhood: Michigan’s Eighth House District. If the Democrats win Michigan’s eighth and every more Democratic district, they win the House; if the Republicans win Michigan’s eighth and every more Republican district, they win the House. The area that represents the new district map voted for President Biden by just 2.1 points in 2020, less than his 4.5 point victory in the national popular vote. That gap — 2.4 points — between Michigan’s eighth and the nation as a whole is, in theory, why you might expect Republicans to be more likely to win the House while losing the popular vote than the reverse.
But much of what will be Michigan’s eighth territory is represented by Dan Kildee, a Democrat. On average, incumbents typically fare about two or three percentage points better than non-incumbent candidates from the same party in similar races. Mr. Kildee did even better than that: in 2020, he won his former district (Michigan’s Fifth) by more than 12 points, even as Mr. Biden won it by four. Even if Mr Kildee is just two points better next month instead of eight, more like an average incumbent, that alone could be enough to erase the gap between the expected result in his constituency and the national vote. A sizable portion of the Republican structural advantage would be negated.
Zooming out, there are 26 districts within the typical starting advantage – about 2.5 points – of the middle district. Twelve of those districts are represented by Democrats, compared to seven for Republicans. It’s not much, but in these races — including in the middle district — Democratic incumbents are poised to undo some of what’s left of the Republican edge.
Zooming in even further, there are two even more Republican-friendly districts — At-Large in Alaska and Ninth in Ohio — where a Democratic incumbent is considered a frontrunner (ranked as a “skinny” Democrat) by the one of the main rating agencies. (Democrat Mary Peltola recently edged out Sarah Palin in a special election in Alaska that used ranked ballots.)
In these races, there is a legitimate chance that the Republicans will lose much of what is left of their structural advantage. There’s not really an equivalent on the other side: although Republicans are highly competitive in a handful of equally tough districts in more Democrat-friendly territory (like California’s 22nd or the first of Ohio), none of these races seem in danger of falling that far. of scope. The best analogy to those races might be places like Maine’s second and Pennsylvania’s eighth, where Democrats are competitive on similar Republican ground.
In the scheme of things, a run here and there might not seem like much. But as we discussed recently, the Republican structural advantage is quite fragile — it’s only about three seats, at least judging by how many districts are better or worse for Democrats than the nation. in general. A few races here or there could easily be enough to not only overcome the underlying Republican advantage, but also reverse it.
The last factor is turn out. Black and Latino turnout tends to drop in midterm elections, especially in noncompetitive, heavily Democratic black and Hispanic districts in noncompetitive states like California, Illinois and New York. Lower nonwhite turnout would shrink Democratic margins in the national vote compared to a presidential election, which is the usual benchmark for judging structural bias. But it would do so without hurting Democratic chances as much in the relatively white districts most likely to decide congressional control.
It’s hard to say for sure how much that turnout factor might help Democrats erase their usual structural disadvantage. We will find out in November. But it has the potential to be a major factor. Even if, hypothetically, each district was contested by both parties, the usual disparity in midterm turnout and the advantage of the Democratic presidency might be enough to reverse the usual Democratic disadvantage in translating popular votes into seats.